Photo credit: Julio Teehankee

A new analysis reveals that the roots of the Philippines' political landscape, dominated by powerful families and fluid party loyalties, are deeply entrenched in a system of clientelism. A 2013 book chapter by political scientist Julio Teehankee explains that this phenomenon is not a modern aberration but a persistent, evolving feature of the country's political life. It is a system built on a transactional exchange of votes for resources, rather than on ideological platforms or public policy.

According to Teehankee, the foundation of this system was laid during the American colonial period. The colonial administration's strategy of establishing local autonomy before central authority empowered local clans, known as the principalia, to become the primary intermediaries of power. This led to political parties becoming "office-seeking" entities, designed to secure patronage and resources, rather than strong, ideological institutions. This historical sequence created a "national oligarchy" of families who, through their control of local power, extended their influence to the national stage.

The democratic restoration in 1986, far from dismantling this system, allowed it to adapt. Teehankee points to several key mechanisms that perpetuate clientelism today. One is party-switching, a rampant practice where over a third of elected representatives change parties, most often to align with the winning presidential administration to gain access to patronage. This behavior fuels the rise of powerful but fleeting "monolithic" parties. Another is pork-barrel politics, a system of allocating government funds for local projects in exchange for political support. This has become a crucial tool for presidents to reward allies and punish opponents. The most visible manifestation of this system is the dominance of political dynasties, with the Philippines having one of the highest percentages of dynastic legislators in the world at 68%. In the absence of strong parties, the family clan serves as the most effective political machine, enabling politicians to secure power beyond term limits and pass it on to the next generation.

This transactional political environment has also given rise to a new class of intermediaries: the political operator. These individuals act as "brokers" within a complex network of clientelism, bridging the gap between powerful patrons and their many clients. Teehankee identifies three types of these operators. The first is the fiscal broker, a politician who leverages their national influence to deliver government funding to their home provinces. The second is the insider, who uses deep-seated connections within the bureaucracy to run "special operations" for campaigns. The final type is the former communist activist organizer, who employs grassroots organizing skills honed in the underground movement to mobilize voters at the local level.

These operators are the gears of the political machine, which is the primary organizational expression of clan politics. This machine controls local positions, embeds allies in the bureaucracy, and funds its operations through both legal and illicit means, ensuring that clientelism remains a resilient and central force in Philippine politics. The persistence of these clientelistic networks, and the inability of the system to foster strong citizen-party linkages, highlights a continuous democratic deficit that remains the core challenge for political reform.